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Abstract 
 
By putting together a relatively large data set on bilateral remittances of emigrants, 
this paper is able to shed light on the important hypothesis of smoothing.    The 
smoothing hypothesis is that remittances are countercyclical with respect to 
income in the worker’s country of origin (the recipient of the remittance), while 
procyclical with respect to income in the migrant’s host country (the sender of the 
remittance).   The econometric results confirm the hypothesis.  This affirmation of 
smoothing is important for two reasons.   First, it suggests that remittances should 
be placed on the list of criteria for an optimum currency area.  Second, it brings 
into doubt plans by governments in some developing countries to harness 
remittances for their own use, in that government spending in these countries 
generally fails the test of countercyclicality which remittances pass. 
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It has been remarked that the economic theory of migration tends to fall between 
the two stools of international trade
1 and labor economics.
2   But the connection to a third 
stool has in the past been especially under-studied:   international finance and 
macroeconomics.    The research described here concerns macroeconomic aspects of 
migrants’ remittances. 
 
Remittances are a large and growing source of foreign exchange in many 
developing countries.    Total recorded workers’ remittances received by developing 
countries increased 73% between 2001 and 2005, reaching a total of $167 billion.
3     By 
2008 they had doubled to $338 billion.
4   Remittances have grown more rapidly than 
private capital flows, or official development assistance.    They constitute more than 
15% of GDP in Tonga, Moldova, Lesotho, Haiti, Bosnia, Jordan, Jamaica, Serbia, El 
Salvador and Honduras. In places like the Philippines, El Salvador, the Caribbean, and 
North Africa, remittances can be the most important single source of foreign exchange.    
Remittances constitute a particularly valuable component of the balance of payments in 
downturns, when markets in locally produced commodities are depressed or when 
international investors have lost interest. 
 
1. The Hypothesis 
 
The hypothesis of this study is that remittances for some countries can play the 
role that capital flows are in theory supposed to play.   In theory, the increased integration 
of developing countries into the world financial system should have carried a variety of 
benefits:   smoothing short-term income disturbances, diversification, helping to finance 
high-return investment opportunities in low capital/labor ratio countries, and disciplining 
policies and institutions in the recipient country.     It is sometimes possible to observe 
these theoretical benefits in operation.   In practice, however, capital flows have -- as 
often as not -- failed to deliver on this promise.
5  Rather than smoothing short-term 
disturbances such as fluctuations on world markets for a country’s export commodities, 
private capital flows are often procyclical:   pouring in during boom times and 
                                                 
1  Among trade economists, the subject goes back at least to Bhagwati and Hamada (1974). 
 
2 Rapoport and Docquier (2005) review the theory that has been developed as part of the New 
Economics of Labor Migration.   Recent contributions include Özden and Schiff (2006) and 
Kugler and Rapoport (2007). 
 
3 Statistics cited here come from “Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration” in 
Global Economic Prospects 2006, World Bank, pp. 86-92. 
 
4 Sanket Mohapatra and Dilip Ratha, “Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Migration and 
Remittances,” Economic Premise, World Bank Feb. 2010, 2. 
 
5  Prasad, Rogoff, Wei, and Kose (2003); Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose (2004); Prasad and Rajan 
(2008).   
  2disappearing in recessions.
6  Rather than flowing on average from high capital/labor 
countries (e.g., the US) to low capital/labor countries, the tendency has been for capital 
often to “flow uphill.”
7  Rather than rewarding only countries that follow sound 
economic policies and punishing only those that follow bad policies, capital sometimes
aids and abets irresponsible budget deficits, including among autocratic and kleptocratic
rulers, especially if they have control of a natural reso
8
 
 
urce.  
 
                                                
 
What reasons are there, a priori, for thinking that remittances might be better than 
capital flows in delivering the benefits of smoothing, diversification, financing high-
return investment opportunities, and disciplining policies?     The sending of remittances 
is a decentralized decision made by individuals, based on a familiarity with and 
appreciation for the needs, desires, constraints, and opportunities faced by themselves and 
their families.  These private individuals do not have the government’s problem of 
needing to spend money in the short-term to win re-election or stave off coups.  They are 
more likely than a central government to know which family members are in truly 
desperate circumstances through no fault of their own, or in which households the 
husband will “drink away” the money, or to know whether it makes sense to save up to 
buy a house or store or establish some other small business.  Theory says that private 
agents do a good job of making these decisions.  In the case of private capital flows, 
historical and statistical evidence casts doubt on this claim.  In the case of emigrants’ 
remittances, it seems more likely to be true. 
 
The World Bank (2006; Box 4.5) argues “In contrast [to oil windfalls], 
remittances are widely dispersed, the great bulk of them is allocated in small amounts, 
and for the most part, remittances avoid the government ‘middleman.’   Hence the 
expectation is that they can avoid the negative effects of natural resource windfalls on 
poverty, growth, and institutional capacity.”    But so far this proposition is more of an 
assertion than a hypothesis that has been widely and successfully tested empirically.     
 
This hypothesis is especially important because many governments in remittance-
receiving countries reflexively treat remittances as a source of foreign exchange that 
needs to be harnessed for national development,
9 rather than letting the recipients spend 
it on “unproductive” uses such as imports of consumer goods.  This rhetoric is common
even among  benevolent governments, let alone the kleptocracies.   Some observers have 
suggested that private citizens might do a good job determining and disposing of 
 
6   Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2005); Reinhart and Reinhart (2009); Perry (2009); Gavin, 
Hausmann, Perotti and Talvi (1996); Mendoza and Terrones(2008). 
7  Lucas (1990); Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych (2005); Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007); 
Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanaian (2007);  Kalemli-Ozcan, Reshef,  Sorensen, and Yosha (2009).    
8 E.g., Lane and Tornell (1998). 
 
9 Chami, Fullenkamp and Jahjah (2005). 
 
  3remittances.
10  But the proposition remains a hope or assertion that has been expressed, 
as much as a hypothesis that has been empirically demonstrated.    It remains in need o
testing.  If the hypothesis is true, then efforts by national governments to harness 
remittances are likely to be harmful, above and beyond the obvious point that taxing them 
could “kill the goose” that is flying the golden eggs into the country.  Government 
spending in developing countries tends to be procyclical, not countercyclical.
f 
                                                
11 
 
The specific hypothesis to be tested in this paper is that emigrants’ remittances are 
counter-cyclical:  that they increase when the country of origin (the recipient of the 
remittances) is in relative recession and decrease relatively when the origin country has 
above-trend relative income.   Under this hypothesis, remittances tend to smooth 
consumption and investment intertemporily.    As mentioned, this is a criterion that 
private capital flows usually fail.   For remittances, the countercyclicality hypothesis has 
been tested by others, and has sometimes been found wanting.   But some of these papers 
are missing something.    For one thing, many simply do not have enough data.    To 
specify an equation well-targeted to isolate the question of interest, it is best to use 
bilateral remittance data. Yet such data are hard to come by; most countries don’t collect 
or report them at all.
12  As a result, studies of bilateral remittances often have an 
inadequate number of observations.     The other item missing in some studies is the 
cyclical position of the host country, which should matter just as much as the cyclical 
position of the country of origin.   If the recipient’s income is included without the 
sender’s, one can estimate a coefficient of the wrong sign, when the recipient’s income is 
highly correlated with the sender’s (for example due to dependence on exports or other 
channels). 
 
Indeed the countercyclicality hypothesis is equally of interest with respect to 
countries that are net hosts to immigrants (net senders of remittances) as for the 
counterparty countries (the recipients of remittances).   Not all of these hosts are 
industrialized countries.
13  If the inward flow of migrants and the outward payment of 
 
10 Chami, Barajas, Cosimano, Fullenkamp, Gapen and Montiel (2008) see macroeconomic 
advantages of remittances of the sort considered here.   Martin (1990), on the other hand, points 
out that a steady flow of remittances can undermine the incentive for governments to create a 
sound institutional framework – a sort of natural resource curse for remittances.    
 
11 Talvi and Végh (2005); Gavin and Perotti (1997); Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008). 
 
12 Jiménez-Martin, Jorgensen, and Labeaga (2007) estimate bilateral workers’ remittance flows 
from the 27 members of the EU, to all recipient countries.  Ratha and Shaw (2005), in the absence 
of hard data on bilateral flows, allocate the totals across partners. 
 
13 Roughly 10 per cent come from developing countries.  South Africa, for example, receives 
many immigrants from neighboring countries to work in its mines, farms, and factories, and sends 
remittances back to the home countries.      In many Gulf countries, immigrants (called ex-patriate 
workers) constitute more than half of the private-sector labor force, both skilled and unskilled.   
For example, outward remittances from Saudi Arabia (not included in the developing country 
statistic) are about 7% of all remittances globally.     
 
  4remittances is especially high in boom times and lower than average in bad times, this 
can be an important macroeconomic stabilizer.   In the boom times it means alleviation of 
potential labor shortages and less danger of excessive monetary expansion, overheating, 
and inflation.
14   In the down times it means alleviation of domestic unemployment and a 
needed improvement in the balance of payments. 
 
We have already mentioned one motivation for exploring the cyclical pattern of 
remittances:   it is an indication whether they play the role of improving intertemporal 
welfare that capital flows are supposed to play in theory, but fail to provide in practice.  
The procyclicality of capital flows is sometimes, for shorthand, given the name Dutch 
Disease (an analogy with the side-effect of inflows during commodity booms, which in 
turn first got its name from the discovery of offshore natural gas by the Netherlands).     
This paper also has a second motivation:  to shed light on the decision of countries to 
adopt a common currency.     
There are two possible relationships between the currency union decision and 
remittances.   On the one hand, a likely benefit of adopting the currency of an important 
neighbor is to facilitate the payment of remittances.    One would like to test that bilateral 
currency links promote bilateral remittances, in the same way that Rose (2000) famously 
discovered that they promote bilateral trade.  On the other hand, if remittances are indeed 
counter-cyclical, then they belong on the list of Optimum Currency Area criteria.
15  
Optimum Currency Area theory (OCA) says that the gains to a country of giving up its 
currency (particularly the facilitation of trade and other international transactions) 
outweigh the costs of losing monetary independence (which is losing the ability to 
respond to shocks) only if its shocks are highly correlated with those of the relevant 
neighbors or if it has alternative mechanisms to cushion itself against the effects of 
asymmetric shocks.
 16     The list of alternative cushioning mechanisms is headed by 
labor mobility, followed by possible international transfers or other financial flows
remittances are countercyclical, then they belong on this list of OCA criteria, and for 
some countries would be more important than the international transfers. 
.   If 
                                                
 
2. Previous Studies 
 
Where earlier authors have findings, the results are interesting, but mixed.  On the 
one hand, Rajan and Subramanian (2005) find that although the Dutch Disease analogy 
does extend to foreign aid  (inflows leading to real appreciation and slow growth), it does 
not appear to extend to private remittances.  On the other hand, Amuendo-Dorantes and 
Pozo (2004) find that an increase in workers’ remittances to countries in Latin America 
and the Caribbean leads to real appreciation of the local currencies, a major symptom of 
 
14 There were problems in the Gulf countries in 2006-2008, for example.   
 
15 Singer (2008) makes the argument that remittances should be and are a determinant of the 
currency decision.   His equation uses the level of remittances, but he cites earlier authors’ 
evidence of countercyclicality. 
 
16 Mundell (1961).   
 
  5Dutch Disease.   Acosta, Lartey and Mandelman (2009), using data from El Salvador, 
also find that remittances have the Dutch Disease effect of raising the relative price of 
nontraded goods, but they also find welfare-improving smoothing behavior.
17   
 
On the specific question of cyclicality, the World Bank has econometric evidence 
that per capita remittances respond significantly to per capita income in the home 
country.
18   But the evidence is weaker regarding the host country.  Remittances are a 
more stable source of foreign exchange than capital flows, including even Foreign Direct 
Investment.  But are they actually countercyclical?    An IMF study of 12 developing 
countries finds “no.”
19  Others find more supportive results.
20    The area is wide open for 
further research.    
 
The recorded data on remittances in countries’ balance of payments are imperfect, 
and certainly undercount the flows.
21  There are also some conceptual questions where to 
draw the line between remittances and, for example, investment or charitable 
contributions. 
 
In the case of bilateral data on migration and remittances, availability of any sort 
has been extremely limited until now.   Thus most existing studies have either operated at 
the level of  a large cross-section of each country’s data on their aggregate remittances
22 
or have focused on bilateral flows as reported by a single country that is a center of 
immigration (such as the United States) or emigration (such as Jamaica
23).   The latter 
sort of data set – bilateral within a region – is needed to study questions such as those 
relevant for the regional currency area decision.   The former sort of global data set can 
                                                 
17 There are also examples of inflows of remittances from emigrants apparently sustaining violent 
conflict -- Northern Ireland, Eritrea/Ethiopia, Israel/Palestine  --  which again resemble effects of 
mineral wealth.   
 
18 World Bank (2006, Tables 4A.2.1 and 4A.2.3 
 
19  Sayan (2006). 
 
20  Clarke and Wallstein (2004) and Yang (2007) find that remittance receipts go up in response to 
a natural disaster.   Kapur (2005) finds that they go up in response to an economic downturn.   
Yang and Choi (2007) find that they respond to rainfall-induced economic fluctuations. 
 
21 Ghosh (2006) and Jiménez-Martin, Jorgensen, and Labeaga (2007, p. 8, 14). 
 
22  The working paper version of this paper, estimated regression equations for remittances that 
are received by four of the smaller countries of southern Africa.  In this case it is a safe bet that 
the majority of emigrants reside in South Africa, and so we can use South African income as 
foreign income.  The results suggested countercyclicality for most of these countries, especially 
when the coefficients on domestic and foreign (i.e., South African) income are constrained to be 
equal in magnitude and of opposite signs. 
 
23 In a study of remittances into Jamaica, Lake (2006) finds that they do respond to the difference 
between US and Jamaican income. She also argues against Jamaican government taxes or 
regulation on remittances.    
  6be used to study some questions along the lines of the Dutch Disease analogy.    But a 
more comprehensive bilateral data set would help tremendously to study both categories 
of remittance issues.   One could hope to attain far better estimates of the cyclicality of 
remittances, and the effects of a common currency, if one had a relatively large bilateral 
data set, rather than proceeding one country at a time or one region at a time as most 
researchers have had to do in the past.    
 
The present study resembles Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2006, 2008), and indeed 
uses the data set on bilateral remittances that they generously made available, among 
other data sources.   But Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz find that “remittances may not play a 
major role in limiting vulnerability to shocks,” indeed that they are procyclical.   Schiopu 
and Siegfried (2006) also created a data set on bilateral remittances between a subset of 
European Union countries and neighbors.  The EU data set was expanded in Jiménez-
Martin,  Jorgensen and Labeaga (2007). 
 
It is to be expected that the stock of immigrants is a major determinant of the 
remittances.   Indeed Freund and Spatafora (2005) find that it has a powerful effect.
24   
Figure 1 shows a plot of the relationship between the stock of immigrants and 
remittances.  The strong correlation is clear.  To some extent this is simply a scale effect.  
When we adjust for size of the country pair (via population in the source country and 
GDP in the host country) in Figure 2, the correlation is naturally much weaker, but is still 
there.
25 
 
3. Results 
 
We begin with the data set collected by Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz, which includes 
64 pairs of countries.   Most of the members of this eclectic set are in Europe and Asia; 
but the Middle East and Australia are also included among the sending countries, along 
with New Zealand, Liberia and Libya for one partner each.    In Table 1 we control 
explicitly for the lagged stock of bilateral migrants.  This variable is only available for 
these countries in a few years.   So we make a virtue out of necessity by running a pure 
cross-section equation, thereby maximizing the number of countries for which both 
variables are available, to explain remittances in 2005 as a function of the stock of 
migrants in 2000.    The cyclicality of remittances in 2005 is likely to be determined not 
just by the behavior of remittances-per-2000-migrant, but also by the flow of migration in 
2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004 (and perhaps 2005), to the extent that the cyclical position in 
those years is correlated with the cyclical position in 2005.  In other words we will 
capture not only the decision of migrants whether to send money home in response to an 
international difference in cyclical position, but also the decision of workers whether to 
                                                 
 
24 The other variables in their equation are per capita income in both countries, a measure of the 
transaction cost, and the exchange rate spread, and a dummy variable for dual exchange rates.  
Faini (2006) argues that the skill level of the migrant has a negative effect on remittances. 
 
25  The data point representing remittances from Portugal to Moldova looks like an outlier.  But 
investigation reveals that this is a real phenomenon, not a data error or artifact. 
  7migrate in the first place.   This combined effect is just as interesting as the pure 
remittance decision.
26 
The lagged stock of emigrants is very highly significant statistically in Table 1, as 
expected.   In column (2) we also control for income per capita in the sender country;  it 
too is significant.    
The variable of interest is the difference in cyclical position between the sender 
country and the recipient country.   In this table, cyclical position is computed as the 
(logarithmic) difference between GDP in 2005 and the long run trend value of GDP.  The 
estimated coefficient is positive and highly significant. (The t-statistic is almost 4.)   This 
is evidence in favor of the countercyclicality hypothesis:     remittances sent back home 
are high when income is above potential in the country to which the worker has migrated 
or when income is below potential in the country of origin.   The effect is evidently very 
large.  Apparently remittances are a “luxury good.”   Perhaps remittances are essentially 
zero until the income of the worker surpasses a threshold, so that a moderately high 
marginal propensity to send remittances after that point shows up as a high elasticity of 
remittances with respect to income. 
 
Even when the stock of migrants is lagged five years, it may contain an element 
of endogeneity.
27  Therefore we apply Instrumental Variables, in column (3) of Table 1.    
There are many plausible geographic, political and cultural determinants of migration.   
To keep it simple, we used instrumental variables which showed up as significant 
(positive) determinants of migration in “first stage” regressions, beginning with the 
border dummy and the island variable.   The change vis-à-vis the OLS equation is slight;  
while the overall significance of the regression falls slightly, the procyclicality of 
remittances is still significant at the 1% level. 
 
Next, in Table 2, we expand our data set into a panel running from 1979 to 2005, 
thereby allowing a big increase in the number of observations, to 1200 or more.  To do 
so, we have to drop the stock of migrants from the right-hand side of the equation.  But 
we can replace it with a list of gravity-style determinants of migration, including size, 
bilateral distance, and other geographic and cultural variables.  One advantage is that any 
suspected endogeneity of the lagged stock of migrants is eliminated.    The barebones 
version includes only the size of the two countries, in this case represented by population, 
                                                 
 
26  One might ask, if the cyclical behavior of migration flows is of equal interest to the cyclical 
behavior of remittances per migrant, why not also the stock of migrants?   Two answers.   First, in 
most cases the stock of migrants has been determined over a long history (by geographic, 
political, cultural and other factors), during which cyclical considerations are not relevant;  we 
should get a better-specified equation and better estimates when controlling for it.    It is only 
over a horizon of a few years that the cyclical question arises.   Second, it is important to control 
for some sort of scale variable.   It would not do to treat the absolute dollar level of US-Mexico 
remittances on a par with the absolute dollar level of Luxembourg-Lesotho remittances. 
 
27 Japan, for example, was essentially in recession throughout the 1990s;  ten years of stagnation 
continued to reduce the stock of immigrants.  
  8which is essential as a scale variable.   (We also retain income per capita in the sender 
country, which is highly significant across all specifications.)     
In Table 2 the cyclical position of the two countries is represented by their 
unemployment rates.  It has the hypothesized negative sign, and the effect is even 
stronger statistically than before:  a t-statistic between 6 and 10.   When we add the other 
gravity determinants, in columns 1-3, most are of the hypothesized signs.   Distance is the 
most highly significant, which is not much of a surprise.  The landlocked and island 
variables are both statistically significant as well, with the hypothesized negative and 
positive coefficients respectively.   Surprisingly, the common border and common 
language variable are not statistically significant.    Perhaps migration and remittances 
across a shared border are less likely to be captured by the official data.  Regardless, the 
important point is that the countercyclicality of remittances is still highly significant.    
We allow for time effects, country effects (whether they are fixed effects or 
random effects), and even country-pair effects.   The fixed effects could be important if 
there are differences in how unemployment is measured across countries, for example.   
The countercyclicality of remittances appears robust.
28 
 
Finally, we expand the set of countries by merging the Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz 
data set with two others.  One comes from the InterAmerican Development Bank, and 
reports bilateral observations on remittances from the United States to eight small 
countries in Central America (including Panama and the Dominican Republic).   Because 
Panama and El Salvador are in this data set, we are able to add a dummy variable for a 
currency union.   The third is the European Commission’s bilateral data set for the 27 
members of the EU.
29   We believe that this three-way merge produces the most 
comprehensive data set on bilateral remittances to date.   To maximize the number of 
pairs of countries, we choose to conduct cross-sections in the years 2003 and 2004.   We 
use as the lagged stock of migrants the level in 2000.   This produces about 330 
observation pairs, which we believe is the largest that anyone has analyzed. 
Figure 3 plots bilateral remittances, expressed relative to the lagged stock of 
migrants, against the relative cyclical position of the host and origin countries.  The 
regression estimations reported in Table 3 show a highly significant coefficient on the 
cyclical position.   This finding is not changed when we control for the income in the 
sender country, though the latter is highly significant, as is the lagged stock of migrants.  
The use of instrumental variables for the stock of migrants diminishes the 
countercyclicality estimate slightly, but its t-statistic is still well above 3. 
                                                 
 
28 The countercyclicality does not show well, however, if the income measure is used in the panel 
data set or if the unemployment measure is used in the pure cross-section.   I am indebted to 
Maurice Kugler for suggesting one possible explanation of this puzzle:  the relative variation of 
detrended unemployment across countries may be limited, and the same with the variation over 
time of detrended income.   
 
29  Jiménez-Martín, Jorgensen and Labeaga (2007).   Inspection of country pairs that appear in 
more than one data set show that the Lueth-Ruiz numbers are much higher, presumably because 
of a more expansive definition of remittances.   In this light, an important next step would be to 
allow each remittance data set have its own intercept term (in logs).    
  9 
4. The Effect of a Common Currency 
 
We added a dummy variable equal to 1 when the pair of countries in question 
were both members of a currency union.   It appears highly significant statistically at 
first, which would suggest that the reduction of transactions cost and exchange risk from 
a common currency promotes the sending of remittances (even controlling for the 
enhanced ease of migration).   However the currency union dummy loses all significance 
under instrumental variables.  This suggest the possibility that the apparent correlation 
under the OLS estimates is not really attributable to the effect of currency unions on 
remittances but rather to the reverse causation:  Central American countries are more 
likely to choose to adopt the dollar as their currency if they have a lot of emigration to the 
United States.
30     
Measuring remittances is always problematic.  Even aside from transactions that 
go entirely unreported, different statisticians may draw different lines regarding which 
international financial transactions are classified as remittances and which are not.
31   In 
Table 4 we allow each of our three data sources to have its own constant term, to allow 
for the likely possibility that some use a more expansive definition of remittances than 
others.    The result shows that the numbers on bilateral remittances for Central America 
data are substantially higher, other things equal, than the other two data sets.   This is 
consistent with the possibility of more comprehensive reporting, but it is also consistent 
with the possibility that the close links between Central America (defined here to include 
Panama and the Dominican Republic) and the United States are not adequately captured 
by the stock of emigrants.   Perhaps we should control for distance, or the cost of 
transferring money.
32     
The effect of the currency union dummy loses its positive sign in Table 4, and 
indeed turns inexplicably but significantly negative under instrumental variables.    
Clearly the change in the currency union result, relative to Table 3, arises because the 
high US share in the trade of El Salvador and Panama is no longer allocated to their 
dollarization, but instead to the high constant term shown by the Central American 
countries in general.     The number of currency union pairs in this data set (two) is so 
small that no firm conclusions can yet be reached regarding their effect. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
To summarize the findings, the creation of a larger bilateral data set, by splicing 
together three data sets used by a few others, has allowed a moderately strong verdict on 
the question of cyclicality.  The verdict runs contrary to the analogy with capital flows 
                                                 
 
30 Singer (2008) finds that remittances as a share of GDP are a statistically significant predictor of 
the probability that a country will choose a fixed over a floating exchange rate.   
 
31 Chami, Fullenkamp, and Gapen (2008). 
 
32  Transactions costs for sending remittances have in the past been surprisingly high, due to lack 
of competition in such services.  Ratha and Riedberg (2005). 
  10and the Dutch Disease:  Remittances do appear to respond positively to the cyclical 
position in the sending country (the migrant’s host) and negatively to the cyclical position 
in the receiving country (the migrant’s place of origin).     This counter-cyclical pattern is 
precisely what one wants.   It suggests that emigrants’ remittances can play some of the 
stabilizing role that capital flows often promise but seldom deliver.  If this empirical 
finding holds up under further investigation, it carries at least two specific policy 
implications.    First, it suggests – though only indirectly, perhaps -- that governments 
should not try to harness remittances in the name of national development, but rather in 
this area should allow private citizens to transact freely, because they are not subject to 
the political economy forces that make government spending procyclical in so many 
developing countries.   Second, it suggests that remittances should join trade, labor 
mobility, and transfers, on the list of Optimum Currency Area criteria. 
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Figure 1: Country-pairs with high bilateral migration also,  
of course, tend to show high bilateral remittances. 
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Remittances between included country pairs are around $113.6 billion. 
   Total of 540 observations =  266 for 2003 plus 274 for 2004.  
 
 Figure 2a : Bilateral stock of migrants (normalized by populations)  
versus remittances (normalized by GDPs) 
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Source: Central America data: FOMIN and the Central Banks. Data from 2000-2007 
Jiménez-Martín, S., Jorgensen, N. and Labeaga, J. M. (2007). Data from 2000-2005 
IMF. Lueth, E. and Ruiz-Arranz, M. (2006). Data from 1979-2005. 
 
Figure 2b : Bilateral stock of migrants (normalized by populations)  
versus remittances (normalized by GDPs), with country identifiers 
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Figure 3: Remittances per migrant (lagged stock) are positively correlated  
with relative cyclical position.   Data for 2003-2004 
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Sources of data: Western Hemisphere data: FOMIN & the Central Banks; 
 
 
Jiménez-Martín, Jorgensen & Labeaga (2007); Lueth & Ruiz-Arranz, IMF(2006). 
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Table 1:  Pure Cross-Section Data, 2005  (Lueth & Ruiz-Arranz data set) 
  Dependent Variable: 
   Ln Remittances 2005 between Countries 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Ln (Stock migrants 2000 )  0.459*** 0.449***  0.327** 
  (0.085) (0.0818)  (0.126) 
Difference in cyclical position 
(Ln (Real GDP/ Trend GDP))  57.585*** 67.909***    65.300*** 
host relative to origin country  (15.875) (16.998)  (17.335) 
GDP per capita Sender   0.061***  0.062** 
   (0.023)  (0.024) 
Estimated Method  OLS OLS  2SLS 
Instrumental variables      Border/Islands 
F test  22.63  19.27  9.35 
Probability > F  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  64 64  64 
R2  0.373 0.448  0.4259 
Root MSE  1.304  1.234  1.2577 
First stage F-statistic      0.07 
P-value     (0.933) 
J-test of overidentifying 
restrictions     0.138 
P-value     (0.620) 
Standard errors in parenthesis       
Constants not reported       
Statistical signficance:  * 10% 
level, ** 5% level and *** 1% 
level     
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Table 2:   Panel Data, 1979-2005  (Lueth&Ruiz-Arranz data set)   
   
   Dependent Variable:  Ln Remittances between Countries 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Difference in cyclical position  
        (unemployment rate)  -10.507*** -8.981*** 
-
11.607*** 
-
11.483***  -12.918*** 
         host relative to origin country   (0.995) (0.976)  (1.125)  (1.947)  (  1.976) 
Host country’s GDP per capita  0.076*** 0.026***  0.049***  0.049***  0.023 
  (0.005) (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.017) 
Colonial relationship?    2.444**  0.076       
     (0 = never, 0.5 = post-1945, 1 = always)  (1.082) (1.007)       
Islands ?  0.644** 0.570**       
    (0 = neither, 1 = one of the pair, 2 = both)  (0.317) (0.284)       
Landlocked   -1.260* -1.431***       
    (0 = neither, 1 = one of the pair, 2 = both)  (0.288) (0.259)       
Language  0.572 0.575       
   (Dummy for common language)  (0.492) (0.440)       
Border (Dummy for land border)  -0.409 -0.547       
  (0.582) (0.523)       
Ln (Distance between i and j)  -0.909*** -0.561***       
  (0.191) (0.174)       
Ln (Product Population i and j)  0.941*** 0.609***    2.963***  3.017***  1.209 
  (0.080) (0.078)  (0.243)  (0.400)  (0.974) 
Time Effects  no  yes  no  no  yes 
Random Effects  yes  yes  no  no  no 
Fixed Effects for Countries  no  no  yes  no  no 
Fixed Effects for Country Pair  no  no  no  yes  yes 
Wald test  731.55  1184.69  1306.28  71.76  44.69 
Prob > χ2 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  1200 1200  1228  1228  1228 
R2 0.389  0.414  0.696  0.304  0.331 
         
Constants not reported           
(Standard errors in parenthesis.)                       Significance  * 10% level, ** 5% level,  and *** 1% level 
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Table 3:   Cross-Section 2003-04 -- Composite data set (merging three sources)   
  Dependent Variable: 
   Ln Remittances 2003-04 between Countries 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Ln (Stock migrants 2000 )  0.761***  0.739*** 1.053*** 1.224*** 
  (0.040)  (0.041) (0.087) (0.151) 
Difference in cyclical position 
(Ln (Real GDP/ Trend GDP))  16.574***  16.316*** 14.988*** 14.266*** 
    Sender relative to recipient  (2.894)  (2.766)  (3.390)  (3.894) 
GDP per capita Sender    0.037** 0.026  0.020 
    (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) 
Currency Union   0.873***  -0.053 -0.556 
    (0.322) (0.333) (0.493) 
Estimation Method  OLS OLS  2SLS  2SLS 
                                                    
Instrumental variables     
border/language/
islands/colonial 
border/lang
uage 
F  test  189.17  146.94 195.83 244.72 
Prob > F  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  333  330 330 330 
R2  0.528  0.547 0.468 0.359 
Root  MSE  1.540  1.516 1.642 1.803 
First stage F-statistic      3.04  4.06 
P-value     (0.018)  (0.018) 
J-test of overidentifying 
restrictions     12.157  8.123 
P-value     (0.007)  (0.004) 
       
Constant  not  reported       
(Standard errors in parentheses.)             Statistical significance:  * 10% level, ** 5% level,  *** 1% level 
        
  21Three sources of remittance data for 2003-04: Central America data, FOMIN and the 
Central Banks, via Interamerican Development Bank; EU data: Jiménez-Martín, 
Jorgensen and Labeaga (2007); IMF data: Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2006, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4:   Cross-Section 2003-04 -- Composite data set (merging three data sets and controlling for each one) 
 
  Dependent Variable: 
   Ln Remittances 2003-04 between Countries 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Ln (Stock migrants 2000)  0.713*** 0.708***  1.087***  1.253*** 
  (0.042) (0.042)  (0.090)  (0.154) 
Difference in cyclical position 
 (Ln (Real GDP/ Trend GDP))   16.477***  15.736***  16.004***  16.121*** 
    Sender relative to recipient  (2.889)  (2.837)  (3.582)  (4.073) 
GDP per capita Sender    0.026* 0.017  0.012 
    (0.016) (0.019)  (0.022) 
Currency Union   -0.376    -0.437***  -0.464*** 
   (0.309)  (0.150)  (0.134) 
IMF data   -3.605***   -4.289***  -7.338***   -8.670*** 
  (0.394) (0.537)  (0.900)  (1.358) 
EU data  -3.771***    -4.308***  -7.621***   -9.069*** 
  (0.404) (0.515)  (0.938)  (1.463) 
Central America data  -2.014*** -2.778***  -7.062***  -8.935*** 
  (0.537) (0.709)  (1.218)  (1.882) 
Estimated Method  OLS OLS  2SLS  2SLS 
  22  23
       
Instrumental variables     
border/language/ 
islands/colonial  border/language 
F test  733.58 603.79  1427.11  1611.49 
Prob > F  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  333 330  330  330 
R2  0.817 0.819     
Root MSE  1.510  1.501  1.67  1.832 
First stage F-statistic       3.34  4.61 
P-value     (0.011)  (0.011) 
J-test of overidentifying  
restrictions     13.365  9.214 
P-value     (0.004)  (0.002) 
 
Constant  not  reported       
(Standard errors in parentheses.)             Statistical significance:  * 10% level, ** 5% level,  *** 1% level 
 
Three sources of remittance data for 2003-04: Central America data, FOMIN and the  
Central Banks, via Interamerican Development Bank; EU data: Jiménez-Martín,  
Jorgensen and Labeaga (2007); IMF data: Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2006, 2008). 
 